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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Federal

through the old producers’ pipelines. The district
court dismissed the new producer’s claim. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the essential facilities
doctrine did not apply because the evidence presented
by the new producer involved a larger, more
expensive pipeline, which did not exist at the time of
the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Therefore, the
court could not conclusively find that the new
producers faced a barrier to entry into the market due
to cost concerns. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held
that the new producer failed to show how the old
producers exhibited anticompetitive behavior under
the rule of reason standard. The new producer never
explicitly sought this standard and failed to provide
evidence defining a relevant geographic market,
market power, and product market as it related to
upstream or downstream natural gas production.

5th Circuit
Basic Energy Serv. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n., 666 F. App'x 364 (5th Cir. 2016).
An ALJ found that an operator of mobile oil and gas
rigs failed to meet the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) standard for “fixed stairs”
and guardrails on their mobile rigs. The operator
argued first that applying these two standards to mobile
rigs creates an absurd result. The court rejected that
argument based on the OSHA Secretary’s definition of
“fixed stairs,” meaning “attached in some way to
prevent movement,” as opposed to the operator’s
definition—“permanently attached.” The court defers to
the Secretary’s interpretation if it is consistent with
regulatory language and not otherwise unreasonable.
The operator next argued that stairs on mobile rigs fall
into an exception for “articulated stairs.” The court
noted that, although mobile rigs have multiple,
independently articulated sections, these rigs do not fall
into the exception, which targets stairs with base
support that rises and falls. The court finally refused to
consider the operator’s argument that the guardrail
provision does not apply to mobile rigs, due to
Operator’s failure to raise the argument before the
Commission.

State
Alaska
Chevron USA, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 387
P.3d 25 (Alaska 2016).
In an administrative decision, the Department of
Revenue (“DOR”) treated separate oil and gas fields
operated by common producers as a single entity
when calculating the producers’ tax obligations. The
DOR had determined that the separate fields were
“economically interdependent” within the meaning of
a tax-aggregation statute because the fields could “be
reasonably treated as an economically unitary
activity.” The producers appealed, arguing that DOR
effectively promulgated a regulation without
following the requisite procedures. The state supreme
court held that the decision was not a regulation but
rather a “commonsense interpretation” of the taxaggregation statute, which did not trigger the
requisite procedures. The decision added no specific
criteria to the tax-aggregation statute’s terms, instead
merely clarifying its language. Moreover, the
“commonsense interpretation” was narrowly tailored
to the case’s facts and was foreseeable given the
well-known purposes of the state’s tax regime.

8th Circuit
Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar
Steel Minnesota LLC, 843 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2016).
A natural gas pipeline owner-operator brought a breach
of contract suit against a customer to enforce
performance of monthly payments in exchange for
transporting natural gas to the customer. The district
court held that it had federal question jurisdiction under
the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). The Eighth Circuit held
that nothing in the NGA allowed a breach of contract
claim in federal court and vacated the district court’s
ruling for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
10th Circuit
Buccaneer Energy (USA) Inc. v. Gunnison Energy
Corp., 846 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2017).
A startup natural gas producer filed an antitrust action
against established competitors for violation of sections
one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The new
producers sought an agreement to transport natural gas
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Louisiana

Texas

Encana Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Brammer Eng'g, Inc., No.
51,045-CA, 2016 WL 6776075 (La. App. 2 Cir. Nov.
11, 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 5, 2017).

Aruba Petroleum, Inc. v. Parr, No. 05-14-01285-CV,
2017 WL 462340 (Tex. App. Feb. 1, 2017).
In a memorandum opinion, a state appellate court
reversed a jury verdict that held an operator liable for
damages under private nuisance theory. Landowners
sued the operator for “environmental contamination
and polluting events,” resulting in a verdict against
the operator for over $2.9 million. The operator
appealed, arguing that the evidence in the record did
not support the jury’s finding of intentional private
nuisance. The appellate court relied on Crosstex
North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, No. 15-0049,
2016 WL 3483165 (Tex. June 24, 2016) for the
proposition that a defendant intentionally creates a
nuisance when it “actually desired or intended to
create the interference” or actually knew or believed
“that the interference would result.” Evidence that the
operator intentionally engaged in conduct that caused
the interference will not suffice to establish an
intentional nuisance. Although evidence supported
the landowners’ claims of correspondence between
employees of the operator and the operator’s affiliate
firms and complaints filed with state environmental
agency, the landowners did not cite evidence
establishing the operator intended or desired to create
an interference with the landowners’ enjoyment of
property.

Operators filed a concurcus proceeding to resolve a
contract dispute between mineral owners and their
agent regarding royalty-based compensation to the
agent. The mineral owners believed the contract
required the agent to reserve an additional free
overriding royalty fee on their behalf to trigger the
agency’s own compensation in the overriding royalty
interest. The dispute arose after a third-party
approached the agent with a bid package to extract
resources near the mineral owners’ interests, but the
agent negotiated an overriding royalty interest only for
his own compensation, per his interpretation of the
earlier contract. The district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the agent, and the
owners appealed. The state appellate court found the
contract’s language unambiguous, concluding that it
required the agent to reserve an additional royalty
interest for the mineral owners beyond a lessor’s
royalty to earn compensation himself from an
overriding royalty interest.
Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, 2016-468, 2016 WL
7402427 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. Dec. 21, 2016), reh’g
denied (Jan. 25, 2017).

Denbury Green Pipeline v. Texas Rice Land, No. 150225, 2017 WL 65470 (Tex. Jan. 6, 2017).

A lessor appealed the judgment in favor of a lessee for
failure to make royalty payments under the mineral
lease. The lease contained a one-fifth royalty provision
of all oil and gas produced. The lessee subsequently
sought to pool the lessor’s interest into a production
unit. The state regulatory agency approved the unit and
issued a conditional allowable and an effective date for
the unit. The lessor argued that, up to the effective date
of the unit, the lessee owed royalty payments according
to the lease. The lessee contended, in contrast, that the
conditional allowable, as defined by the state regulatory
agency, governed the royalty payment to lessors and
abrogated the lease terms. The court rejected the
lessee’s argument; the conditional allowable does not
abrogate the lease terms prior to the effective date of
the unit. Unless explicitly stated by the agency’s
unitization order, the terms of the mineral lease govern
the relationship between lessor and lessee until the
effective date of the regulatory order.

A pipeline company applied for and received
“common carrier” status from the Texas Railroad
Commission, which allowed them to condemn land
for a carbon dioxide pipeline. Landowners attempted
to stop the pipeline from crossing their land. The
pipeline company filed for a temporary and
permanent injunction; in the case’s second
appearance before the Texas Supreme Court, the
Court determined that the pipeline company was a
common carrier because it could show a reasonable
probability that the project would serve the public;
thus, the right to eminent domain was reasonable.
The pipeline company had produced sufficient
evidence of a reasonable probability of serving the
public at some point in the future. The lower courts’
application of “substantial public interest” was
erroneous: a slight public interest, such as contracting
to transport carbon dioxide for one or more
customers, is sufficient for common carrier status.
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Parker Cty Appraisal Dist. v. Bosque Disposal Sys.,
LLC, 506 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016).

Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc, No. 08–15–00080–
CV, 2017 WL 192911 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2017).

Landowners petitioned to review the tax assessment of
four subsurface saltwater disposal wells as separate
property from the surface, causing the landowners to be
subject to double taxation. The landowners claimed that
the wells were not separate property interests because
the surface and subsurface estates were not severed and
argued that the tax code does not allow double taxation
of the same property. The Texas tax code and common
law, however, permit property appraisal based on
individual characteristics and additionally provide that
double taxation is not automatic just because a fee
simple estate overlaps with other taxable categories
such as leasehold or mineral interest. The separate
assessment of the disposal wells used an approved
revenue-based method plus the value of the surface
based on its market real estate value. Because the
landowner’s argument was largely based on the
mistaken understanding of the tax code, the appeals
court held that the assessor could tax the that wells
separately from the surfacea and reversed and
remanded the trial court’s summary judgment for
landowners.

The operator of secondary recovery injection wells
obtained permits from the Texas Railroad
Commission (“Commission”). A neighboring oil and
gas developer sought a restraining order and
injunction, claiming “imminent danger of irreparable
harm” to its mineral interests. The operator moved to
dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that § 85.241 of the Texas
Natural Resources Code (“Code”) requires claims
against Commission decisions be brought in the
Commission’s Travis County seat. The operator also
argued that § 85.321 of the Code prohibits “equitable
relief” without plaintiff first suffering injury. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal,
the court held that the Code does not preclude preinjury equitable relief but specifically contemplates
the existence of claims either in Travis County or at
the “local courthouse” where the threat of the injury
exists, negating any argument of exclusive
jurisdiction within Travis County.

Westport Oil & Gas Co., L.P. v. Mecom, No. 04-1500714-CV, 2016 WL 7234056 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec.
14, 2016).

Richardson v. Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV, 2017 WL
511893 (Tex. App. Feb. 8, 2017).
Grantees’ successors-in-interest appealed a district
court finding that a earlier document pertaining to
minerals under certain property was a lease between the
grantors and grantees that the grantees had released in a
later document. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Texas, Tyler held that the earlier document was instead
an unambiguous mineral deed because the habendum
and warranty clauses contained the word “forever.”
“Forever” signaled no limitation or condition on the
conveyance of the mineral interest to the grantees.
Additionally, the appeals court held that the later
document was an unambiguous release of an
unrecorded lease rather than a release related back to
the earlier document—the deed. Only three of the six
signers of the earlier document signed the later release.
Plus, the later release referred to a definite period for
the lease to exist, which the earlier document did not
contain. The appeals court held that the grantees’
successors-in-interest still owned the one-half mineral
interest.

Gas royalty owners brought an action against a gas
producer for underpayment of royalties. The lease’s
royalty clause calculates the royalties as a percentage
of the market value of the gas produced from that
well. The royalty owners argued that the market
value is subject to the gas purchase agreement clause,
which contains a formula for minimum payments of
gas purchases. The producer paid royalties for the
strict percentage of market value at the well, which
was lower than the minimum used in the gas
purchase agreement clause. However, the appeals
court found that the plain language of the two clauses
keeps them independent with no reference to the
other and no uncertain or doubtful language
susceptible to more than one meaning. Though the
royalty payment may use the gas purchase agreement
formula, in this lease, the gas purchase agreement
clause only applies to future purchases and the
royalty clause alone controls royalties.

728
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss6/6

SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
Federal

The producer did not argue for liquidated damages
when MISO would not take the producer’s electricity
for other reasons. The district court found for the
company. But the appeals court found for the
producer: non-clearing price bids fell within the
liquidated damages clause because of the company’s
“failure to obtain Transmission Services” either by
lower bids or by finding alternative transmission
services.

7th Circuit
Benton Cty. Wind Farm LLC v. Duke Energy Ind.,
Inc., 843 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2016).
A wind energy producer and a local electricity
company contracted for the Company to buy
electricity from the producer’s wind farm for $52 per
MWh produced and sell it to the grid under
Midcontinent
Independent
System
Operator
(“MISO”) for twenty years. When the producer’s
wind farm came online in 2008, it was the only wind
farm in the area, and the company could purchase
and sell all 100 megawatts. By 2013, the producer
was no longer the only wind farm; total generation
capacity had exceeded total transmission capacity in
the area, such that MISO now treated wind farms like
other electrical generation units, requiring
curtailment. With MISO’s changes, the company
began bidding $0 for the producer’s wind production
where the market clearing price was $0 or above,
even though it paid $52 per MWh produced to
Producer no matter the market clearing price
obtained, thus usually operating at a loss. If the
market clearing price is below $0, then MISO did not
buy the producer’s generation and the company did
not pay the producer the $52 per MWh. The company
did not elect to drop its regular bid below $0, nor did
it choose to build additional transmission lines to
increase capacity. The producer sued the company
for failure to lower the bid price or help increase
transmission capacity, meaning the company owed
the producer liquidated damages under the contract.

State
Texas
City of San Antonio v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas,
506 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App. 2016).
A wholesale electricity market participant had agreed
to provide non-spinning reserve services to an
independent systems operator. But due to a
combination of harsh weather, mechanical failure,
and questionable management oversight, the state
public utility company (“PUC”) penalized the market
participant for violating a state administrative rule by
failing to perform. The market participant exercised
its right, under state rule, to seek judicial review of
the PUC’s decision. The market participant argued
that the PUC “interpreted and applied” the state rule
in a “new and novel manner” that conflicted with
TXU Generation Co., L.P. v. Public Utility
Commission of Texas, 165 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App.
2005). The appellate concluded that the PUC did not
enforce a new interpretation of the state rule because
the language was plain and unambiguous.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal

State

4th Circuit

Colorado

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co. LLC, 845
F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2017).

Grand Valley Water Users Ass’n v. Busk-Ivanhoe,
Inc., 386 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 9,
2017).

Environmental groups sued to enjoin a coal company
from allegedly violating the Clean Water Act (“Act”).
The coal company argued that its permit issued
pursuant to the Act shielded it from liability. The
district court agreed with the environmental groups,
finding that the coal company’s permit required it to
adopt the state’s water quality standards, even if the
permit language does not specifically enumerate those
standards. On appeal, the coal company argued that
the permit controls the conduct of the state regulator,
rather than the regulated entity. The court rejected this
argument, citing that unambiguous language in the
permit refers to the regulated entity’s actions, not the
regulator’s actions. Even if the court found the permit
ambiguous and used extrinsic evidence to interpret it,
extrinsic evidence supported the finding that the
permit required compliance with state water quality
standards. The court additionally found that the coal
company’s disclosure of its planned discharges during
the permitting process does not shield it from liability.
The appellate court upheld the lower courts findings
that the coal company violated its permit.

A municipality owns the rights to divert water from
one river to a river basin to supplement irrigational
uses. Beginning in 1987, however, the municipality
diverted water to different, undecreed river basins. The
municipality also diverted water to a reservoir to be
used for later supplementation, which was outside of
its decreed rights, but it had done so with no objection
since the 1920s. In 2009, it finally filed an Application
for Change of Water Rights. This application calls for
a representative study period of beneficial use to
determine the legitimacy of the need for a change in
rights. The appeals court found that the law regarding
transmountain water does not provide for automatic
rights to store that water in a decree for rights to use
the direct flow of that water, nor was the right to
storage implied in the decree. The court required the
years of undecreed use were to still be included in the
representative study period needed for the change of
rights then remanded the case to the Water Division to
determine the future use of water rights.
Montana

9th Circuit
United States v. Barthelmess Ranch Corp., 386 P.3d
952 (Mont. 2016).

All. for the Wild Rockies v. Krueger, 664 Fed. App’x
674 (9th Cir. 2016).

Objectors appealed the Water Court’s decision in
favor of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),
which claimed control over five reservoirs and one
natural pothole lake. The objectors claimed that the
Water Court erred in both its determination that BLM
holds rights under Montana law in these reservoirs on
federal land and that BLM owns reserved rights for
stockwatering by permittees in the pothole lake under
federal executive power. The court found BLM’s
claims to the water arise from its reservoir
construction, which the objector’s ancestral free
grazing rights under Montana law does not preclude.
Further, the enabling statutes and executive order
properly reserved the pothole lake to the federal
government; therefore, BLM correctly claimed rights
to this water.

An environmental group moved to enjoin a National
Forest Service (“NFS”) project, alleging violations of
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National
Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and NEPA. The
trial court found no such violations and granted
summary judgment for NFS. The group appealed, and
the court of appeals affirmed: First, NFS had not
violated ESA because it properly relied on Fish and
Wildlife Service records, which indicated that no
grizzly bears inhabited the project area. Moreover,
NFS had not violated NFMA because it relied on the
“best available science” in implementing the project
and ignored no relevant data. Finally, the impact
statement regarding the project fully addressed the
perceived environmental effects and thus was not
arbitrary and capricious.
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Pennsylvania

Washington

Lester v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1778 C.D. 2015,
2017 WL 127805 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 13, 2017).

Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperial Terminal Services,
LLC, 387 P.3d 670 (Wash. 2017).

Pennsylvania’s Department
of Environmental
Protection (“DEP”) ordered a landowner’s son to
remove certain underground storage tanks from his
family’s land. The Environmental Hearing Board
upheld the order, finding that the landowner’s son
financially responsible as “operator” of the tanks per
the spill-prevention statute. The landowner’s son
appealed, arguing that he was not the operator of the
tanks. But the court held that he had “managed,
supervised, altered, controlled, or had responsibility
for the operation” of the tanks, making him an
“operator.” Moreover, the landowner’s son had
claimed operator status in several instances when
completing DEP forms. The Son also argued that
because he did not own the tanks, imposing financial
responsibility on him amounted to a taking. The court
reasoned, however, that the spill-prevention statute
was a valid exercise of the state’s police power.
Because the order served the statute’s purpose of
eliminating contamination and removing underground
tanks, requiring tank operators to expend financial
resources was not unduly oppressive.

Two oil terminal companies operating on the coast of
Washington wanted to expand their storage
capabilities to facilitate more traffic. Between the two
proposals, rail traffic could increase by 973 transits
(133%) per year and ocean vessel transit would
increase by 520 transits (310%) per year. The
Department of Ecology (“DOE”) and the city both
approved the permits, but an Native American tribe
and ecological conservation groups (collectively,
“Petitioners”) challenged the permits. The Petitioners
claimed that the DOE and city incorrectly applied the
Ocean Resources Management Act (“ORMA”). The
Court of Appeals held that the ORMA regulations are
narrow and do not govern these permits. On appeal,
the Washington Supreme Court reversed those
limitations of the ORMA. ORMA intends to protect
against the dangers of oil transportation on oceanic
life. The terminal companies argued that their
proposed activities did not fall within this regulation
as it was not “transportation” or “ocean uses” as
defined by the DOE. The Supreme Court also held this
to be incorrect. For these reasons, the permits required
review under ORMA.
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
Federal

burdened the Non-residents’ “common calling” to
commercial fishing, they did not violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because the state
had a substantial interest in recouping the loss in
revenue from Non-residents that it could collect from
state taxpayers. And the fee differentials did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they
were rationally related to a legitimate state interest of
recovering the Non-residents’ share of benefit
provided to them by the state’s management of its
commercial fishery.

9th Circuit
Marilley v. Bonham, 844 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2016).
Non-resident
commercial
fishermen
(“Nonresidents”) filed a class action against the Director of
a State Fish and Game Department claiming
violations under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The dispute
arose under statutory mandates that charged Nonresidents higher fees for fishing licenses, vessel
registrations, Dungeness crab permits, and herring
gill net permits (collectively, “fee differentials”). A
federal district court granted the Non-residents
summary judgment; the Director appealed. The Ninth
Circuit reversed. Although the fee differentials
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